G03 · Windows · FixedBound faucet work and propagate cancellation
The original solver accepted a difficulty of 65 even though a SHA-256 hexadecimal digest has only 64 characters. A request could therefore leave hashing work running indefinitely. Difficulty, challenge counts and lengths are now checked before work begins. Cancellation and solve/total budgets reach requests and hashing. Focused limit, cancellation and deadline regressions pass.
G06 / T03 · GTK · Source fix verifiedRestore token-transfer classification
The GTK host omitted sendTokenTransfer from its signing-call set, so legitimate NFT transfer and burn actions were refused before execution. The entry is restored. The new port tests compare the declaration with its own pin and now pass natively on Linux; the independent inventory and removal control also passed. Live NFT transfer/burn was not exercised.
G07 · Windows · Native validation dueCreate sensitive files with private permissions
The earlier writer relied on inherited directory permissions. The implementation now creates each sensitive temporary file with a protected DACL allowing the current user and SYSTEM before writing, then replaces the target. Public artwork opts out. The test that returned immediately on macOS has now executed its actual Windows assertions and passed. It checks protected wallet-file permissions under a permissive parent, replacement permissions and the artwork opt-out. The creation API supplies the DACL before writing; a separate first-byte observation and network-share check were not added.
K02 · Windows · FixedRedact unhandled exceptions before persistence
The old unhandled-exception handler appended complete exceptions directly to a crash log. It now uses CrashLog.Append, whose formatter redacts every exception line before writing and rotates the file. Synthetic nested-exception and rotation tests pass. The original finding was a hardening gap; a real spending-key disclosure through this path was not demonstrated.
T04 · Windows · Fixed in 4327c79Hold the bridge turn until the asynchronous result settles
A dedicated engine thread serialized invocation but allowed two pending asynchronous signing calls to overlap. A benign test export confirmed maximum concurrency of two; it did not demonstrate transaction or key substitution. The correction adds one foreground call per bridge with up to 64 FIFO waiters. Timer, fetch and device callbacks continue on the engine thread while that call awaits its result.
Read deadlines begin only when admitted. Success, rejection and timeout release the turn; a timed-out read resets the context before the next call begins. Abandoning the caller’s wait does not release an unresolved signature. Regressions cover ordering, synchronous and asynchronous failure, timeout recovery, queue saturation and independent bridge instances. The change is merged into local main; no push was performed during this audit.
Validation follow-up · Windows · Fixed in 09d580eLogging test now owns its bridge and log
LoggingPolicyTests.ConsoleLinesFromJavaScriptAreRedactedAndCapped previously read the last echo from TaquitoBridge.Shared, which another parallel test also used. The original full native run failed its replacement-marker assertion; the preceding assertion excluding the original synthetic key and hex string passed. No raw-key disclosure was demonstrated.
The test-only correction creates a private bridge and unique temporary log, then asserts that exactly one matching echo exists in that instance. All original key-exclusion, marker and line-length assertions are retained. No production logging code changed. The native focused run passed 7/7, followed by a full offline run with normal parallel execution: 505 passed, 0 failed, 14 skipped.
The fix, 09d580e564a96efea5ef53fb1b9a3c5783ea817b, is merged into main on both machines. The follow-up is closed at that verified revision; no push was performed. Historical failing results are preserved.
G01 / T02 · Experimental Shielded Transaction support · Reproduced cases repairedReserve each one-time signing index atomically
Process-local locks alone allowed separate writers to reserve the same WOTS+ index. A later path-alias probe also found two process-local lock identities for one file. Canonical lock identity plus a file lock now protects the complete update. Actual-source probes reserved indices 0 and 1 and persisted 2. Subsequent native Windows and Linux lock/alias regressions passed. Network-share providers and mixed-version writers remain outside the checked scope.
G02 · Experimental Shielded Transaction support · Open limitationSeparate shielded keys remain plaintext
The experimental feature generates its own master spending key. It remains directly serialized in wallet JSON and backups, independently of a Tezos account password. User-facing warnings now explain that distinction. File permissions reduce access but do not encrypt an obtained copy. Encryption remains an experimental-feature improvement, outside production/mainnet scope.
G04 · Experimental Shielded Transaction support · Open limitationExperimental service connections still use HTTP
The shipped experimental operator and rollup services use HTTP. Traffic, including the operator bearer token, lacks transport confidentiality. Warnings identify these connections; they do not supply encryption. This observation concerns the services used by Experimental Shielded Transaction support, which cannot be used on mainnet. No live interception or token-privilege exploit was performed.
G05 · Experimental Shielded Transaction support · Reported mismatch repairedKeep store and backup read limits consistent
The original writer could create state that its reader refused. An intermediate repair still left backups limited to 32 MiB while the store accepted 128 MiB. The store, backup snapshot and fingerprint paths now share the shielded-file bound, and excessive writes fail before replacement. Synthetic files of about 38 MB save and reload; complete backup regressions above 40 MiB pass in the native Mac, Windows and GTK/Linux checks.
G08 · Experimental Shielded Transaction support · Reported paths repairedValidate untrusted levels before arithmetic
A Swift fee path added to an untrusted head level before clamping it, allowing an extreme integer to trap. Levels are now protocol-range checked and related fee additions report overflow. The reported paths and error cases pass the native regressions. The original exact expression did not apply to Windows, which widened its integer before addition.
G09 · Experimental Shielded Transaction support · Scheduling implementedSchedule backups after essential mutations
The backup file list included shielded state, but a startup snapshot could predate a newly generated key or receive address. Backups are now scheduled after essential creation, reservation and pre-submission record paths. Windows also backs up after reserving a signing index. Storage failure can still prevent completion; this fix does not guarantee a fresh snapshot after every possible state transition.
T01 · Experimental Shielded Transaction support · FixedPreserve uncertainty across rejected retries
The exact payload and its record are now persisted before contacting the operator. Transport and transient polling failures keep note reservations, and the interface offers an exact-payload retry. A refusal of a later attempt cannot prove that the earlier attempt was never accepted, so retry refusals preserve the original record. The regression simulates acceptance with a lost reply, rejected retries for both operations, retained reservations and later replay after correcting the token.
Recovery · Experimental Shielded Transaction support · Policy and verification pendingWhere the signing counters live
Each shielded address has its own next-unused WOTS+ index, serialized as accounts["<tz-account-address>"].addresses[i].nextKeyIndex in tzel-<chain>.json in the selected wallet directory. The default Shadownet paths are:
Mac / GTK: ~/.signet/tzel-shadownet.jsonWindows: %USERPROFILE%\.signet\tzel-shadownet.json
The increment is persisted before signing. The adjacent lock file coordinates access; authentication-tree binary files contain rebuildable leaves. Neither replaces the JSON as counter state. Backup generations include that JSON, so restoring an older generation can restore an older index. A restoration policy must preserve one-time-key safety. The concurrency fixes alone do not establish that policy, and no destructive restore or successful forgery was attempted. These observations concern Experimental Shielded Transaction support, which cannot be used on mainnet.